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As the Editor was driving into work today (5th April - the printer has asked for copy early this month) he saw a large delivery van with emblazoned on its side the words 'Another delivery from L.C.M.' - not, alas, his van, however thriving may be LCM (without punctuation) with its over 400 subscribers one of whom is surely due his free subscription for being the 400th, and he will get it when the Editor has leisure to make the true count. But *Liverpool Cooked Meats* is perhaps a not inappropriate description of the pabulum he monthly serves to his young lions.

He also passed, on one of the fine Edwardian public libraries of this city, an apposite quotation from Francis Bacon - 'Reading maketh a full man; conference a ready man; and writing an exact man'. Bacon said nothing about typing, but readers of LCM will not believe that it maketh an accurate man. Not but what the only corrigenda this month (perhaps it is too early for aggrieved contributors to have written about last month's issue) are to editorial matter. On the last two pages S.J.Heyworth was turned into Heywood in the catch titles at the top of the page, and he apologizes to him for that. It has also been put to him that he still has not got the unfortunate Jaya right, and that they should be the Irian Jaya, and he would be glad of clarification as he has not been able to trace the reference yet.

The quotation will have alerted readers that the Editor this month has room and inclination to advert upon Conferences, which proliferate, and those who wish may be warned to stop reading. He was struck by the Johnsonian words of the organizer of one such, that it was a good enough conference, but not a conference he would have attended had he not been obliged to, and was led to wonder just why it is that Conferences, Seminars, Colloquia and so on do still proliferate even in a period of rising costs and increasing unwillingness of Universities to pay staff for attendance. In the world of science and medicine, he understands, word of mouth at conferences is the only way in which results can be communicated fast enough for them to be of any use, but this is hardly true of the arts (though contributors do complain that even LCM is not fast enough for them - but this is publication and not necessarily communication). But the Editor suspects that this is another area in which the arts are imitating the sciences - and also wishing to demonstrate - not perhaps in the best way - that they are vigorous and alive (perhaps the proliferation of journals is another such - *de se fabula narrat* - or should it be *me?*). Certainly many gatherings originally confident of their purpose do seem to be seeking ways of adapting to a perceived desire for more and more specialized conferences (those used to the Editor's Delphic style may guess to what he is referring) - but time and space run out and he must be off to Cardiff to the Classical Association - where presumably he hopes to sell more subscriptions to LCM.

- 66 F. JONES (Cape Town): *An aspect of Petronian speeches* LCM 9.5 (May 1984), 66-69

'Man delights me not - no nor woman neither, though by your smiling you seem to say so.'
Shakespeare, *Hamlet* II.2

If there is little agreement about whether the *Satyricon* is parody (and of what?), satire, comedy, tragedy or picaresque novel, it seems generally admitted that it is a well written one. Petronius' characterization (see Beck, George, Rankin 1970, in the list of references at the end of this note), for instance, is multilayered and effective. We learn a good deal about Trimalchio from what others say of him, and from his own actions and words (spoken and signposted). And in general a character's use of language and his style has a role in characterization (George).

An economical touch comes in 128.1-5. After her disappointment, Circe's *quid est? numquid te osculum meum offendit?* ... looks like a series of angry rhetorical questions. Encolpius' reaction supports this. But when Circe turns to her maid and asks a very similar series of questions (significantly altered: note, for example, *dic Chrysis, sed verum* in place of *quid est?*) with the same structure (opening, triple *numquid*, pendant), and then checks in the mirror (note Chrysis' silence) and rushes off, an impression of insecurity is insinuated. Details cohere: *nec speculum mihi, nec fama mentitur* (129.9) shows that the failure rankled because of its reflection on Circe, and her preference for the lower orders (126.7; cf. Juvenal 6.109ff.) and ready resort to beating (132.2-5; cf. Juvenal 6.475ff.) cease to be merely elements in conformity with a type. Add her apparent coyness in her entry (127.1-2) and at 131.10, and the romantic rhetoric at 127.4ff. with its false note in 127.6 (she harps on Giton rather obsessively: 127.2, 4 & 7; 128.1; 129.8). The elements are coherent, but sufficiently diversified to suggest a person rather than a cardboard cut-out with a selection of stereotyped attributes.

Sometimes there are narratorial comments. In any modern first person narrative, narrator's judgements on the behaviour of others are necessarily dependent on the awareness and partiality of the narrator (so too Encolpius seems particularly critical of others when he has vested interests or is made to look foolish [Beck 1975 & 1979]), and there may be guesses made (as at 113.3, *non dubie*).

Alternatively the narrator may merely set down such visible symptoms as tears or laughter without trying to unravel the complexities behind them (cf. *AP* 5.66). The sequel to the Matron of Ephesus is worth considering. What begins as a cynical tale of woman's fickleness (110.6-8), but becomes more ambivalent (at the end of the tale the woman is *non minus misericors quam pudica*, 112.7, and *prudenterissima*, 112.8; see Beck 1979, 249-250), is received *risu* by the sailors, with a blush and a described gesture by Tryphaena, and with outrage by Lichas (113.1-3, a tricolon crescendo). The narrator, apparently, feels no need to explain *risu*; he attempts to explain Lichas' anger (his explanation being based on personal knowledge, it seems, 113.3; cf. 106.2 and Walsh 1970, 74 n.2); Tryphaena's reaction is less simple than the sailors' and more deserving of explanation, especially since the narrator takes the effort to note it. Perhaps the behaviour of Tryphaena is to be regarded as beyond the narrator's powers of analysis (at 131.10 *hesternae scilicet iniuriae memor* is either an interpolation [Müller] or the narrator's crude guess; for *memor* cf. 106.2); the subtlety of the story of the Matron of Ephesus is such as to preclude Tryphaena's blush being a simple case of the cap fitting (and Lichas' coarse reaction at 113.2 is, in itself, a factor which puts the Matron in a better light).

In effect 113.1-3 may be regarded as a subtle evocation (by the author) of the emotions of the parties involved, and of the limitations of the narrator. My purpose in this note is to consider some related aspects of Petronius' dramatization of situations, which have a point of contact with my opening quotation (so used by F.R.Earp, *The style of Aeschylus*, Cambridge 1948, 150ff.). although his Aeschylean examples are of a different kind of vividness).

Abrupt changes of direction are characteristic of oral discourse (note M.L. West, *Hesiod: Works and Days*, Oxford 1978, 41-59), and there are many examples in the *Satyricon*. Two should suffice. At 38.6 Hermeros, who started by talking of Fortunata, has been describing Trimalchio's affluence: *tanta est animi beatitudo, reliquos autem, he veers, collibertos eius cave contemnas*. So, at 69.2, Trimalchio suddenly reverts from his comments at large on Habinnas' slave to address Scintilla, *tu autem* ... Some of the speeches in the *Satyricon* are quite long, and this feature gives variety as well as being naturalistic. Outside literature such

speeches would be punctuated with choral assents or other interpolations, and this too may be indicated by the change in direction in a way like that of the tag from *Hamlet*. For example, at 66.5 *bene me admonet domina mea* indicates that Scintilla has spoken (and that Habinnas has heard, and that theirs is that kind of relationship, and so on).

There are antecedents for this (e.g. Horace, *Odes* 1.27.17ff.; Catullus 7.1), but it is not merely a literary device, nor is it so common in Petronius simply because people of certain social backgrounds are incapable of keeping to one subject for more than a few sentences. Such transitions will occur in virtually all levels of unprepared oral language, and are part of the complex verbal and non-verbal interaction of individuals and circumstances. Thus at 67.1 we realize that while Habinnas has been speaking he has noticed the absence of Fortunata and that he is sufficiently interested to ask (the scene at 67.12 is near enough to make some connexion; the length with which he deals with food first, however, may indicate his priorities). We learn, in short, a fact (that Fortunata is not at the moment present) and see something of Habinnas' way of reacting to circumstances.

In the same way, the impression a speaker feels he is making can be indicated (the smile of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern; see also Horace, *Odes* 2.4.22ff., *fuge suspicari* ...). This gives an additional depth in that the reaction of the hearer(s) is part of his characterization. For variety the sequence may be dealt with explicitly (as at 57.11 - 58.2, where compare *tu autem* with 69.2) or implicitly. In 47.5 after some talk of intestine functions Trimalchio says *rides, Fortunata, quae soles me nocte desomnem facere?*. We may note Fortunata's attitude and also Trimalchio's inability to keep up with his pretensions (contrast 77.4), and the ease with which he is distracted from concealing his inability. We get a fully rounded glimpse of a human event and its background in personal history.

Of course there are degrees of complexity. Since the speaker is always subjective he may misinterpret audience reaction. Echion, whose suppressed anti-intellectualism and brutalized practicality become clear from 46.3 onwards (his type is not unlike the object of Eumolpus' penetrating observation in 84.2-3), reveals the insecurity we might have expected in 46.1: *videris mihi, Agamemnon, dicere: 'quid iste argutat molestus?' quia tu, qui potes loquere, non loquis. non es nostrae fasciae, et ideo pauperorum verba derides. scimus te prae litteras factum esse ...*. As Agamemnon is a parasite we may suspect that 'quid iste argutat molestus?' is at the least exaggerated. But we have nothing but Echion's word for Agamemnon's thoughts, and since his embarrassment follows his prolonged expression of interest in blood (45.1-13; see Smith at 45, and add that Cicero's objections to the games in *Fam.* 7.1 [cf. Pliny, *Epp.* 9.6], based on intellectual snobbery, would be precisely of the kind to give Echion embarrassment) we may deduce that whether or not Agamemnon shows some slight sign of boredom Echion has some unexpressed self doubt. This suits the tone of over-reaction and the selection of Agamemnon, the man least likely to show boredom but most likely (as an educator) to be felt *per se* as a personified rebuke: *quis enim potest probare diversa?* (84.1)

I do not believe this account of 46.1 is over-subjective: if one makes the starting assumption that the turn is an authorial device to avoid our boredom by giving rise to a new train of thought, one may or may not be struck by an immediate psychological plausibility. If we are (as is usual in the *Satyricon*, it seems to me) there is nothing which disallows us from crediting it. A rather less innocent subjectivism begins with assertions that the picture held up before us is for our amusement or criticism. It is a short step from here to the chimera of 'pure' comedy (note Averil Cameron reviewing Walsh 1970 in *CR* ns23[1973], 44-47).

The placing in a speech of these redirections may be significant. When Habinnas asks about Fortunata's absence (67.1) and answer naturally follows, so that here perforce is the end of his speech. By contrast, Hermeros' tangent at 57.11 is not of its own nature a concluding comment. Because it comes at the end of the speech, rather than acting as a basis for more abuse, *quid nunc stupes ...?* becomes ineffectual, and resembles a common observed gambit for sidestepping the initiative for making the transition from verbal abuse to physical violence. If the antagonist answers, he must either back down or say something which would count as justification for the first blow. Eumolpus' quick and easy transition at 95.4 should be contrasted (*etiam minaris?* is a genuinely rhetorical question, as is shown by *simulque*). This contrast and Giton's release of his laughter at this point (58.1) confirm the resemblance and the fact that the ploy is anticlimactic: no fight ensues. This should be borne in mind with regard to 58.4, discussed below.

A rather different final turn is dependent on the speaker noticing (in one

68 way or another) his hearer's behaviour may be seen at 89.1. Encolpius has met Eumolpus and listened happily (88.1) to the tale of the Pergamene boy. He asks about the pictures before them, and Eumolpus gives a rhetorical and inaccurate (Walsh 1970, 96-97) account of the decline of the arts. He finishes tangentially: *sed video te totum in illa haerere tabula, quae Troiae halosin ostendit. itaque conabor opus versibus pandere*. There follows the poem. Despite 88.1 it may well seem curious that Encolpius should be so completely absorbed in this particular picture: at 83.1-6 he had been most taken with those relevant to his situation, whereas this picture is much more in line with Eumolpus' poetic style. All that is required to make the details cohere is a simple visualization. Encolpius and Eumolpus are walking along looking at a row of pictures, Eumolpus declaims until he gets a picture giving him the best opportunity to indulge his poetic proclivities, and he chooses this point to notice what Encolpius has presumably been doing all along: looking at the pictures.

Clearly such redirections can only happen after the beginning of a speech, but just as Eumolpus pretends (?) to notice something at 89.1, Echion does or thinks he does at 46.1, and Trimalchio does at 47.5, all some way into their speeches, so Trimalchio starts two speeches with analogous perceptions. It is worth noting them to show Petronius' adaptability. At 61.1-2 he suddenly says to Niceros *solebas suavius esse in convictu* ... and proceeds to prompt a story. The device is economical: the unheralded abruptness of the perception characterizes a certain stage in drinking, as does Niceros' behaviour as indicated in the speech, and his start into vitality from 61.3. Trimalchio's speech has the additional formal function of generating the two stories that follow. At 64.2-3 Trimalchio makes a very similar speech to Plocamus, this time maudlin and completely unfruitful. The differences are an index of the increasing effects of alcohol on the characters (significantly enough Encolpius' greater intoxication is mentioned in the sentence introducing the speech). The different use and effect of repetition and variation here and in 128.1-5 (see above) may be compared with the repetition of the 'no, really' gambit within the stories themselves, 62.6 and 63.6 (note Trimalchio's greater competence and cf. 74.15, Trimalchio again).

Redirection of speech gave rise to a poem at 89.1 (and something similar, to two stories in 61.1-2 and a change of mood in 64.2-3): my final examples concern precipitation of action. As mentioned above, Hermeros comes to an anticlimax at 57.11; he does so again in the same sequence at 58.4. Laughed at by Giton (58.1) he turns from Ascyllus and vents his new anger. Threat is subsumed into abuse by the indirect *vix me teneo, nec sum caldiceretrius, sed cum coepi, matrem meam dupundii non facio*. With the next sentence (58.4) the inconsequent rant assumes a direction and open threats are made. We can at the least say that Hermeros, having lost impetus in 58.4, needs to regain initiative, and tries to do so with *recte, videbo te in publicum*. But to give proper stress to *recte* (cf. Smith on 58.4; Bucheler's *index sermonis* under *recte minantis*) it is much better to visualize that which Hermeros ironically assents to as a mock threatening gesture on Giton's part ('All right then, I'll see you outside!'). With 47.5 and 66.5 in mind such a visualization is easy. Accepted, it adds detail to our view of Hermeros and Giton. Finally 74.17: Trimalchio makes in passing an abusive comment about his wife while she is recovering from being hit with a cup (74.10-13). His speech is continuous, and we might imagine Fortunata as either carrying on weeping and groaning as in 74.11-13 or as giving some indication of displeasure at the new insult: it is at this moment that Trimalchio says *recte, curabo me iugibus quaeras*. Visualization is hardly to be refused, and there now obtains an acute observation of the unsynchronized but linked cycles of aggression between two characters.

I have given examples of some of the places in the *Satyricon* where Petronius uses a dramatic technique to adumbrate the scenes behind the speeches and to increase the fullness of the characters. There is little point in making an explicit link with Shakespeare on the grounds of a quotation from one play. In any case, Shakespearean devices are so various that several may be found in almost any literary work. But having prefaced this note with *Hamlet* I am prompted to say that no one in the *Satyricon* except Eumolpus has the verbal dexterity to make anything like Hamlet's speech of despair. But Eumolpus divorces his tragic fulminations from real life, relegating them to second rate poetry (see Beck 1979): when he speaks *propria voce* (and these two facts are connected) he is perhaps the most exuberant and robust character in the book (on his style see also George, 342ff.). In a very real sense he seems *nescio quid magnum promittere* without ever achieving it (I would not, however, use the word 'hypocrite' of him). Encolpius, by contrast, is the

character who might most genuinely have uttered a tragic soliloquy, but his articulacy is superficial: his attempt to do so for Lichas is artificial (115.9ff.; see too 132.9ff.), and he achieves nothing by way of coming to terms with reality when Giton leaves him (80.7ff.) or again at 100.1-2. His speeches are a way of diffusing raw experience (see Rankin 1969, 99ff.). 'He is, in the broadest sense, suffering from psychological impotence', as has been remarked on other grounds (George, 349).

I have avoided saying that the *Satyricon* is a tragedy of the inarticulate dependent on second hand formulations (or money or sex) and thereby stultifying their emotional life. Such a view would provide little account for the moments of hilarity (e.g. 108.5) or for Eumolpus. But the peaks of comedy are in character, and it is largely Petronius' characterization which gives the narrative unity and makes it more than a parody of epic or romance, or both. Indeed, such parody as there is often directs itself against the second hand grip on reality the *dra-matis personae* tend to have.

- REFERENCES: Beck 1975 = R.Beck, *Phoenix* 29(1975), 271ff.
 1979 = *Phoenix* 33(1979), 239ff.
 George = P.A.George, *Arion* 5(1966), 336ff.
 Rankin 1969 = H.D.Rankin, *Latomus* 28(1969), 99ff.
 1970 = *Eranos* 68(1970), 123ff.
 Walsh = P.G.Walsh, *The Roman Novel*, Cambridge 1970

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N.POSTLETHWAITE(Leicester/Australian National University, Canberra):

Hektor - best of mortals?

LCM 9.5(May 1984), 69-70

In an article in LCM 8.4(Apr.1983), 61-62, 'The meaning of ἐνθάδε at *Iliad* 21.279 and 23.348', V.W.Matthews has suggested that in these two passages from the *Iliad* ἐνθάδε is better translated 'here - on earth' than 'here - at Troy'. My concern in this paper will be with the first of these examples, ὃς ἐνθάδε γ' ἔτραψ' ἄριστος, which is spoken by Achilles and refers to Hektor, and which Matthews would wish to bear the meaning 'best of mortals' rather than 'best of the Trojans'. The consequences for our understanding of the *Iliad* of having Achilles call Hektor 'best of mortals' are obviously great indeed, and should perhaps cause us to look once more at ἐνθάδε at 21.279, since nowhere in his paper does Matthews even imply that Achilles intends to say 'Hektor, best of mortals, - except of course for myself'. Indeed, Matthews appears to indicate the contrary when he speaks of 'Achilles' generous acknowledgement of Hektor's prowess ... in the following line (21.280), 'a brave man (ἀγαθός) would have been the slayer, and a brave man (ἀγαθός) would he have slain'.

The non-sigmatic aorist active of τρέφω is always intransitive, with the one exception of I.23.90, and bears the meaning 'to be brought up' or 'to grow up' (cf. R.J.Cunliffe, *A Lexicon of the Homeric Dialect* [1924], 389). Typically it refers to human development from childhood to adulthood, and is normally associated with a reference to the place or home in which this development occurred. For example, at I.7.198-9, Aias speaks of his own upbringing:

ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἐμὲ νηῖδα οὕτως

ἔλπεμαι ἐν Σαλαμῖνι γενέσθαι τε τραφένμεν τε,

at I.23.83-4, Patroklos speaks of himself and Achilles:

μὴ μὰ σὺν ἀπάνευθε τιθήμεναι ὅστέ', Ἀχιλλεῦ,

ἀλλ' ὁμοῦ, ὡς τράφομεν περ ἐν ὑμετέροισι δόμοισιν,

and at I.2.166

Τληπόλεμος δ' ἐπεὶ οὖν τράφ' ἐνὶ μεγάρῳ εὐπύκτιν, ... ,

(cf. also I.18.436, O.3.28). In short, the verb refers to the growth of one or more individuals within the home, and on no occasion appears to be used in the generalized sense 'mortals who are raised on earth'.

The meaning of ἐνθάδε is obviously more difficult to check, since its occurrences are too numerous to be listed by G.L.Prendergast, *A Complete Concordance to the Iliad of Homer* (rev. B.Marzullo, 1962). However, it is possible to make an informed conjecture from the examples cited by Cunliffe (p.131). He identifies two meanings, 'here' and 'hither', and in support of the former he cites I.12.70,

κυνόμους ἀπολέσθαι ἅπ' Ἀργεὺς ἐνθάδ' Ἀχαιοὺς.

in which ἐνθάδε clearly bears the meaning 'here - at Troy'. In fact this same meaning attaches to all the examples which he cites from the *Iliad*: 1.171, 2.203, 296, 343, 5.172, a fact which is scarcely surprising in view of the geographical limitations of the poem. It is equally predictable - in view of their position in the poem - that the examples which Cunliffe cites from the *Odyssey* should refer

either to Ithaka or Sparta: 2.51, 4.178, 594, 599, 601, 655. Of these Odyssean examples the first is particularly worthy of note, appearing as it does in a line very similar to the one under consideration:

τῶν ἀνδρῶν φίλοι υἱες οἳ ἐνθάδε γ' εἰσὶν ἄριστοι.

In each of the examples noted ἐνθάδε refers to a specific geographical location. It is surely to be concluded that the examples detailed in this and the previous paragraphs suggest a presumption that the words ἐνθάδε γ' ἔτραψ' ἄριστος at *I.21.279* will mean 'born and bred at Troy'.

If there is this presumption that ἐνθάδε will mean 'at Troy' rather than 'on earth', why is Matthews anxious to deny it this meaning at *21.279*? In part he is concerned because 'nowhere in the *Iliad* is Hektor, or anyone else, described specifically as 'best of the Trojans' or 'best in Troy'; yet at *I.17.80* Hektor himself is told by a reproachful Apollo/Mentes that Menelaos

Πατρόκλῳ περιβῶς Τρώων τὸν ἄριστον ἔπεφνε,
Πανδοίδην Εὐρορβον, ἔπαισε δὲ Θούριδος Ἀλκίης.

However, Matthews' principal concern is to demonstrate that there is a motif of mortal and divine running through the theme of Achilles' death: Achilles is about to die - or rather thinks he is about to die - an ignominious death, drowned by Skamandros; yet the death which he knew had been predicted for him was at the hands of Apollo (and Paris); he therefore cries out in despair that, if he may not die at the hands of the best of gods, he would prefer to die at the hands of the best of mortals. This of course provides a neat antithesis, but, as has been argued above, Homeric usage does not lend strong support to this interpretation. Moreover this suggestion raises two important questions to which I wish to turn briefly at this point. Firstly, does the action of the *Iliad* prior to *21.279* make it at all likely that Achilles would call Hektor 'best of mortals'; and secondly, what would be the consequences for our reading of the *Iliad* of accepting that Achilles did indeed call him this?

In reply to the first of these, Hektor's attitude to his and his antagonist's relative merits seems quite unequivocal, at *I.20.434*:

οἶδα δ' ὅτι σὺ μὲν ἑσθλός, ἐγὼ δὲ σέθεν πολὺ χεῖρων.

There is no hint here that Hektor regards himself as the equal of Achilles, let alone 'best of mortals'. Achilles' attitude also seems clear-cut. To him Hektor is ἀνδροφρόνιος (*1.242*; cf. *9.351*, *18.77*), and εἶον (*9.351*; cf. *356*, *18.103*), but this in no way compares with Achilles' opinion of his own prowess at *18.105*:

τοῖος ἔων οἷος οὐ τις Ἀχαιῶν χαλκοχιτώνων
ἐν πολέμῳ.

Furthermore in accepting the inevitability of his own death Achilles is aware, and says that he is aware, that it will come as a consequence of his prior slaughter of Hektor, thereby again asserting his own superiority (*18.90*; cf. *114*). He recalls how once before he defeated Hektor in single combat (*9.352*); he offers his opinion that Hektor's rampage will come to an end when he reaches Achilles' ship (*9.654*); and he promises the dead Patroklos that he will bring him Hektor's armour and head (*18.334*). Presumably he was aware that Aias had already beaten Hektor (*14.409*); and, shortly before his encounter with Skamandros, he tells Hektor to his face, at *20.452-3*,

ἢ θῆν σ' ἔξανώ γε καὶ ὕπερον ἀντιβολήσας,
εἴ πού τις καὶ ἐμοίγε θεῶν ἐπιτόροδος ἔστι.

There appears not a single doubt in the mind of Achilles, or in his words, that he is superior to Hektor and that, provided the gods are agreeable, he will defeat him in any encounter. It is within this context that we should regard the suggestion that Achilles 'says that he would have preferred to have been killed by the man he recognizes as the greatest human fighter'.

The consequences of accepting that Achilles did indeed recognize Hektor as the greatest human fighter are really too great to be explored satisfactorily in such a brief paper as this. It is perhaps sufficient to say that Achilles would thereby in effect deny, or surrender, his heroic status. Throughout the *μῆνις* it had been Achilles' contention that the Achaians, and Agamemnon in particular, had dishonoured the 'best of the Achaians' (e.g. *1.243-4*). It was to assert this status that he had withdrawn his services and had appealed to Thetis, and it was this status which had pervaded his great speeches of *Iliad 9*. Having thus asserted his claim to that title, it is surely inconceivable that he should award the greater title 'best of mortals', without reservation, to a warrior whom he had character-

For a number of reasons, therefore, it seems preferable to retain the original interpretation of *I.21.279*: that in despair at the ignominy of his impending death Achilles prays for an heroic death at the hands of the Trojan champion. Such an interpretation is consonant both with Achilles' status as hero, and with the prior and subsequent action of the *Iliad*.

A.D. FITTON BROWN (Leicester): *The contribution of women to ancient Greek agriculture*

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In recent centuries the contribution of women to agriculture has been substantial; P. Herfst, *Le Travail de la Femme dans la Grèce Ancienne*, Utrecht 1922 (now Arno Press), p. 15, cites official sources for the situation in Germany between 1895 and 1907; the film *Bitter Rice* bears eloquent testimony to the position in Italy; and an article in the *Guardian* (31 January 1979) described the lot of Turkish women, caring for the house but still expected to work virtually full time in the fields. Whatever limitations have been laid on the social life of women in modern times, economic necessity has certainly given them the 'freedom' to work out of doors. In antiquity the situation was very different.

First, the world of Homer. Here we find, I think, a general assumption that women should spend a substantial part of their time within the house; Penelope is never found outside in the course of the *Odyssey*, and λευκώλενος is applied to Nausicaa's handmaids as to herself. But there were many occasions on which it was appropriate for women to leave the house; Helen and Andromache visit the walls of Troy (*Iliad* 3.139ff.; 6.386ff.; cf. the passage from the *Little Iliad* mentioned below), and the people greet Arete when she appears in the streets of Scherie (*Odyssey* 7.71f.). And then of course there is Nausicaa's famous washing-expedition. It should, I think, be noted that Homer has a strong poetic motive for sending her along; if Odysseus is to emerge alive from his twenty days in the sea, he must find a river-mouth; and who will come upon him by a river-mouth but a washing-party? And who of the washing-party will have the presence of mind to stand and speak to him but the princess herself if she comes? And of course this is fairyland where princesses go about without fear. But I think we can reasonably infer that the idea that a maiden of good family might choose to accompany her slaves to the washing-places will not have struck an Homeric audience as risqué or improper.

Likewise in the land of the Laestrygonians, a princess goes to the well to draw water (*O.* 10.105ff.); and so do the daughters of Celeus in the *Hymn to Demeter* (2.105ff.). So it seems that one barrier to women's outside work - the general assumption that their place was in the home - was not a very substantial one. On the other hand, Homer concerns himself almost exclusively with princely houses where economic necessities are not much felt. Alcinoos seems to regard his daughter's expedition as a harmless, perhaps laudable, way of passing her time. The truth is that weak social pressures militating against women's outdoor work are offset by weak economic pressures tending to encourage it. What then of agriculture? In the scenes from the Shield of Achilles (*Iliad* 18) we find women preparing food for the harvesters and helping to carry in the grapes (559; 567); harvest and vintage call for additional helpers, and it may also have been felt appropriate that the whole community should participate in the festivals of Demeter and Dionysus - though we should observe that the Athenians of the 5th century did not see the matter in this light (Demosthenes 57.45).

For the rest we have *Odyssey* 15.427, where we are told that Eumaeus' nurse was kidnapped by pirates when she was 'coming in from the fields' - at Sidon admittedly, but it seems likely that Homer envisaged a Greek situation. What had she been doing there? Perhaps gleaning - this resort of poor people which is mentioned in the *Book of Ruth* is unlikely to have been unknown in Homeric Greece - but she was not poor. Perhaps winnowing corn - the song of the women πλωσσουσάν (Aristophanes fr. 339) may well be an old one; or (just possibly) she was a shepherdess, such as we find in the Hittite documents (cf. O.R. Gurney, *The Hittites*, Penguin 1952, p. 81, the estate of Tiwataparas), though she would probably have been expected to look after the shepherds rather than tend flocks for herself. In the hymn mentioned earlier, Demeter expects her new friends to believe that she too was kidnapped by pirates, so the pretence is clearly that she was outside the city when it happened (2.123ff.). Finally we learn that Themisto bore Homer in the Cyprian countryside far from wealthy Salamis (Euclous ap. Pausanias 10.24.3), but there is nothing to indicate that she worked on the land. Altogether the evidence for women's agricultural work in Homeric times is meagre, and this seems to have been as true of slave-girls as of their mistresses; they would doubtless be sent on errands more readily than free-born women (*O.* 16.151ff.); but in general men's notion of what was proper employment for women applied to both slaves and free (similarly within the house, slaves carded the wool while the mistress wove, but all were part of a combined activity).

In Hesiod economic factors come into their own. Women are compared to drones who 'devour the fruit of others' labour' (*Theogony* 591) - unless to be sure they can be forced to do economically significant work. The childless ἐπίδοος of *Works & Days* 602 is probably intended to run the house, but Hesiod has been giving us some remarkable advice at 405-6 (the words are governed by σῶντα ἀνάγειν, 403-404):

ὄξιον μὲν πρῶτιστά γυναικά τε βοῦν τ' ἄρο ἦρα,
κτητὴν, οὐ γαμετὴν, ἥτις καὶ βοῶν ἐποιεῖ.

The suggestion is that his brother should furnish himself with a house, and ox and a woman - a slave-woman, that is to say, not a wife, so that she can follow the plough-oxen (or pasture the cattle). West, ad loc., may well be right in thinking that Hesiod must originally have employed γυναῖκα in the sense of 'wife', for it is house and wife which are the first essentials for a continuing family. But it remains true that someone refashioning the passage before the end of the 5th century B.C. considered that the ploughing slave-woman fitted into the world of Hesiod. And he may well have been right. According to Hamish Forbes in *Expedition: The Magazine of Archaeology and Anthropology*, vol.19(1976), pp.5ff., 'the traditional plough of the Mediterranean lands ... is the light ard or scratch plough. Unlike the mould-board plough, this tool merely breaks up the soil without turning it over'. The fact that a man who has ploughed all day may be thankful to see the sun set (*Odyssey* 13.31ff.) does not mean that a woman cannot usefully take over the job while her master rests or attends to other things. Here it seems that economic necessity is causing Hesiod to employ women for work for which even female slaves were generally thought unsuitable in ancient times. And if we prefer to understand 406 as meaning that the woman would pasture rather than plough, the same comment applies: not until nearly the end of the pagan era do we find shepherdesses - slave shepherdesses, that is - taking charge of the flock away from the steading.

Somewhat in the harsh spirit of Hesiod is the fragment from the *Little Iliad* where a Trojan girl is heard remarking: 'Even a woman could carry a load when a man had lifted it on to her back'. Edward Lear described how, on a visit to Albania in 1849, he saw women being used as a substitute for mules; and it does not seem wholly unlikely that a Hesiodic Greek would force his wife or female slave to carry his equipment for him to a distant field.

By contrast with Hesiod, the iambic misogynists only play at being poor. Semonides' ape-woman lollops through the town making a fool of her husband, but he neither locks her up nor packs her off to work in the fields. Semonides' demands on women are not very exacting - apart from providing him with a grievance, their function is essentially to bear children and behave themselves. The bee-wife's virtues are curiously negative - particularly when contrasted with those of the Capable Wife of *Proverbs* 31, which may have been written about the same time - and although she will certainly have performed the duties neglected by the mare-wife (grinding, sieving, muck-raking and cooking), we are not actually told so. We learn from an historian, however, that during this period Melissa, daughter of Procles, tyrant of Epidaurus, was out in the fields serving wine to the reapers when Pericles fell in love with her (Athenaeus 13.589F); we recall the women on the Shield of Achilles, and Virgil's Thestylis who was preparing *moretum* for the reapers wearied by the scorching sun (*Ecllogue* 2.10f.), and Chloe 'dressing meat' for the vintagers who had come over for the festival of Dionysus (Longus 2.1f.). Once again we are left with the impression that work in the fields - at any rate at harvest-time - was a laudable, though not an essential, occupation for women.

When we come to democratic Athens of the 5th century we find that the counterbalancing pressures I spoke of have greatly increased - materially speaking we have a buoyant economy crying out for labour; socially and psychologically speaking we have an intensely competitive society in which the life-style of the wife profoundly affected the prestige of the husband (see in particular P. Walcott, *Loved I not Honour more*, *Latin Teaching* 1980, 19ff.). A rich Athenian would not allow his wife to work to acquire wealth, as opposed to providing goods and services within the home - if change of fortune compelled him to make more use of her earning potential, he lost face. One could almost construct a sliding scale for this process; perhaps the least damaging concession would be to sell the wife's produce outside the home, while keeping her inside; then to get rid of a slave-girl and send the wife to the well to wash the clothes and draw water. The next step would be to take a stall for her in the market - an expedient which Athens, with its eager demands, encouraged more than some other cities (Menander Rhetor 1.364.4); this, as suggested by Aristophanes' sneers at Euripides' mother (e.g. *Ran.* 840), would be

humiliating enough, but it would not be the worst of fates - in fact, in the 4th century, it was an offence (that of *καταγορία*) to disparage a citizen, whether male or female, for trading in a market (Demosthenes 57.30). Very likely the women's stalls formed a block. The worst fate of all, to judge from the same speech (57.45), was a form of employment which exposed the wife to the attentions of unrelated men; such work is indeed 'servile', though Euxitheus insists that it does not compromise the citizen status of the person who engages in it. Of the occupations he mentions, that of wet-nurse would involve going into a strange house where a woman could hardly avoid meeting unrelated men, and that of grape-picker would obviously lay her open to approaches; *ἐπίδογ* seems to be a vaguer word, something like 'hired helper'; but here, as in *AP* 9.89, the writer may be thinking in particular of gleaning, where again a woman might find herself subject to molestation. Here then are gradations of labour from which an Athenian would fight to protect his womenfolk with increasing desperation.

Menander presents us with two problems. At *Dyskolos* 328ff. we are told that Knemon's misanthropy is such that he works the farm unaided - his one companion is his daughter, and he usually works with her by his side, conversing with no one else. Is this because he needs her help with the work? Or because he loves her very much? Or because he is afraid of passers-by and dare not leave her unattended very long? The first explanation surely cannot be right; our passage makes it clear that Knemon does all the work alone. Nor can I detect any sign that he feels exceptionally strong love towards her; on the day when the action of the play takes place he leaves her inside the house like any other daughter of a citizen. On the whole I think that Knemon keeps his daughter beside him (usually) because (remarkably enough) he believes that she might be molested if he left her in the house. Then why does he not let, or make, her help him with his work? Presumably because the Athenians had come to regard all agricultural work as unsuitable for women, even where - as here - they were adequately protected.

And what of Terence [Menander] *Adelphi* 845ff., where Demea tells Micio how he will deal with Ctesipho's concubine? 'I'll see to it that, with cooking and grinding, she gets all made up with ash and smoke and chaff; what's more, I'll make her gather straw right in the middle of the day - I'll have her as black and charred as charcoal!'. At first sight this seems to imply that a man who had a farm would expect his female slaves to help with the agricultural work in addition to their other duties; by contrast, in Philemon's *Emporos* [Plautus *Mercator* 395ff.] Demipho, who has sold his farm, refers only to their indoor tasks. But when Demea mentions the cooking and grinding, and then goes on with *praeter haec* to add straw-gathering to the list of torments, I think that Menander is hinting that he is going far beyond what would in fact be considered tolerable.

But why should we not simply accept the employment of slave-women on the farm as a sensible expedient in many situations? In *Classical Journal* 73 (1977-8), Mr Michael H. Jameson says that 'within their physical capacity, they too worked as needed on the farm'. I do not think that this is so obviously true as to require no supporting evidence. Slave-women of course went out of the house more frequently than citizen-women did; Syra will go to the fields to call Manes in (Aristophanes *Pax* 1146), and Thracista will be sent out to fetch wood - and get into trouble (Aristophanes *Ach.* 271). But of systematic exploitation of women in agriculture, whether slave or free, I can find nothing to set beside the 'cottage industry' mentioned by Xenophon (*Mem.* 2.6.39 - 7.14); it was this, and the market, which reflected the economic strength of Athens; if there was any need for women's labour on the land, it never made itself felt.

Vase paintings supply evidence of one - and only one - 'agricultural' task performed by women, the gathering of apples. Black-figure vases account for the great majority of these illustrations; red-figure vases for only six (I owe this observation to Miss Grainne Cullen; an example will be found at Plate 23 of Charles Seltman, *Women in Antiquity*, Pan Books 1957). It seems likely that the orchards were juxtaposed to the houses and perhaps surrounded by a common wall, so that the women could not be molested or even seen by passers-by. It is, I suppose, possible that the decline in the number of illustrations in the 5th century reflects an increasingly neurotic protectiveness.

Why then did women play such a small part in ancient Greek agriculture? Part of the answer may be that, when urbanization set in, they tended to stay in the town, while their husbands worked on the farm, sometimes residing there (like Laches in *Heayra* of Apollodorus and Terence) but often commuting daily. But J. Pečírka in *Problèmes de la Terre en Grèce ancienne, recueil de travaux*, Mouton et Cie.,

74. Paris, La Haye 1973), 113ff., has probably established that homestead farms were not very uncommon in Attica and elsewhere, and there will surely have been women living in the country for reasons more reputable than Phano's (Demosthenes 59.65). Another possible explanation may be that, without the variety of crops that are available in the modern world - without tobacco, tomatoes, rice, cotton, citrus fruits, potatoes or many root vegetables - there was simply no need for women's labour except at special times and in special circumstances.

But I think we must allow for a deep-seated protectiveness towards women without which a place in agriculture would have been found for them as quickly as it was found for Chinese women as soon as foot-binding stopped. Under the Pax Romana the country-side gradually became safer for women, and eventually they began to take over the actual duties of shepherdesses (Varro, *RR* 2.10.1), though still, like Antigone in *Oedipus Coloneus*, τοῦτιόντος ἀφράδου (752, and cf. Theocritus 27 and Longus 2.20). At the same time Stoic doctrine tended to alleviate irrational prejudices, and in the 2nd century A.D. we find Hierokles (*Oeconomicus*, Stobaeus vol.3 Hense, pp.696ff.) reiterating the traditional duties of women, drawing water, splitting wood, lighting fires, grinding corn, kneading dough, etc., and then recommending that husbands should consider helping with the heaviest of these, while the wives helped with sowing, harvest, vintage and garnering of olives. Again there is no suggestion that the work should be differentiated by status. It seems that the humane and practical advantages of assigning work by capacity to manage it rather than in accordance with traditional inhibitions were beginning to prevail.

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HELENA DETTMER (University of Texas at Austin): *A fresh look at Catullus 1.9*
LCM 9.5(May 1984), 74-75

I wish to thank F.O.Copley for reading the final draft of this article.

Because of the number of recent articles in LCM on Catullus 1.9 (G.P.Goold, LCM 6.9[Nov.1981], 233-238; F.Mayer, LCM 7.5[May 1982], 73-74; O.Skutsch, LCM 7.6[Jun.1982], 90; and B.Arkins, LCM 8.2[Feb.1983], 18-20), it seems quite unnecessary to review arguments for and against Mynor's reading of line 9 in the OCT,

quare ha e tibi quidquid hoc libelli 8
qualecumue; quod, <o> patrona virgo,
plus uno maneat perenne saeclo 10

or Bergk's/Munro's/Goold's emendation,

quare ha e tibi quidquid hoc libelli, 8
qualecumue quidem patroni ut ergo
plus uno maneat perenne saeclo 10

(T.Bergk, *Philologus* 12[1857], 581; H.A.J.Munro, *Criticisms and Elucidations of Catullus*, Cambridge 1878, 1-; and G.P.Goold in J.A.S.Evans, ed., *Polis and Imperium*, Toronto 1974, 255-264, and LCM loc.cit.). By now the issue should be familiar. Also the present study will not attempt to repair the line. Instead, it will offer new evidence of a structural nature that suggests that, however the final three lines of Catullus 1 are punctuated, however the words that follow *qualecumue* in line 9 are emended, the Muse should be retained.

I. Students of Catullus who subscribe to the view that the poet is responsible for the shape of the entire corpus (and I am one of them) are fond of pointing out that there is a slight connexion among the poems that heal each metrical tripartition, 1-60, 61-64 and 65-116: the Muse similarly figures in 1.9, 61.2 and 65.2 (e.g. T.P.Wiseman, *Clio's Cosmetics*, Leicester 1979, 176-178; and B.Arkins, LCM loc.cit., 18). Each initial poem, too, refers to Callimachus, or to Catullus' Callimachean pretensions (Wiseman, loc.cit., 176-177). In 1.1-2 Catullus' adherence to Callimachean precepts is expressed symbolically; the description of the physical appearance of the *libellus* (*lepidum, novum, arida modo punice expolitum*) applies to the content of the book as well. In 65.16 Callimachus is alluded to by the patronymic *Battiadae*, 'son of Battus'. And in 61. the topography, *Heliconii* (1) and later *Aganippe* (30), calls to mind Callimachus' dream in the prologue to the *Aitia* (on which point, see D.O.Ross, *Backgrounds to Augustan Poetry*, Cambridge 1975, 33), in which the Greek poet was transported to Mt. Helicon, home of the Muses.

The opening poems share two other features, both of consequence for the problem

at hand. The one concerns the place of the Muses; the goddesses are introduced in each poem in a penultimate position, in the second line from the beginning or the end (*virgo*, 1.9; *Uraniae*, 61.2; *virginibus*, 65.2). Further, in 1 and 65 they occur in exactly the same place, the final position of the line. The other feature is even more notable. All three poems depict the Muse or a Muse-substitute (Hymenaeus) as a *virgo*. In 61.6-10 Catullus bids Hymenaeus come dressed as the bride (*tenera virgo*)

Accordingly, from a structural perspective, the reason why the addressee changes at the end of 1 from Cornelius Nepos to the maiden Muse now becomes clear: Catullus exploited the Muse to create parallels among his three introductory poems. To remove the goddess from 1 would destroy this conscious artistry. In addition, the poet's request for the immortality of his poetry - which, as proponents of *patrona virgo* like to point out, is traditionally directed to a deity (cf. Ph. Levine, *CSCA* 2[1969], 214-216; and F. Cairns, *Mnemosyne* 22[1969], 156) - performs another artistic function: the prayer in lines 9-10 provides a transition to the parody of the hymn in the poem immediately following.

II. The first poems of Horace's *Odes* 1, 2 and 3 offer further evidence that the connexion among these key Catullan poems was deliberate. *Odes* 1.1, 2.1 and 3.1 also share similar features, as well as furnishing striking analogies to Catullus 1, 61 and 65.

As in Catullus, the Muse figures in each of Horace's introductory poems (1.1.32-34; 2.1.36-40; 3.1.3). Here too the goddesses hold similar places. In *Odes* 1.1 and 2.1 they are mentioned in the fourth line from the end; in *Odes* 3.1 they occur in the third line from the beginning. Only one initial Horatian and Catullan poem names specific Muses, *Odes* 1.1 and Catullus 61 (Euterpe and Polyhymnia, 1.1.32; Urania, Catullus 61.2). The other two poems refer to the goddesses generically; Horace calls them *Musae* (1.1.36; 3.1.3), Catullus *virgines* (1.9; 65.2). Further, in both poets' works the first unspecified Muse is in the singular, the second in the plural. Horace's and Catullus' introductory poems also converge in that one of the three is directed to a writer of history (Nepos, Catullus 1, and Pollio, *Odes* 2.1), and at the end of these same poems the addressee similarly shifts to a solitary Muse (F. Cairns, *Mnem.* 22[1969], 157-158).

Lastly, Horace, like Catullus, alludes in each first poem to his Callimachean pretensions. The reference to Callimachus in *Odes* 1.1 and 3.1 is manifest. Both *me gelidum nemus | nympharumque leves cum Satyris chori | secernunt populo* (1.1.32-34) and *odi profanum vulgus et arceo* (3.1.1) echo Callimachus' disdain for the common rabble (ep. 28.4 Pf.). The programmatic content of *Odes* 2.1 (36-40)

*sed ne reliatis, Musa procar, iocis
Caei retractes munera reniae,
mecum Dianaeo sub antro
quaere modos leviori plectro*

is not so obvious, however, for two reasons. 1) The roles of poet and warning figure in the conventional *recusatio*, of which *Odes* 2.1 represents a variation, have been inverted; and 2) the Muse has assumed the part that the Callimachean Apollo would have played as a warning figure (cf. Vergil, *E.* 6.3-5). The purpose of these deviations is to justify Horace's departure in the preceding lines from the Callimachean precept of singing about kings and heroes (i.e. Roman history) by shifting the blame from himself to the goddess of inspiration: the insolent Muse led Horace astray from the lighter themes of neoteric poetry.

The parallels that emerge through comparison of Horace's and Catullus' initial poems, and especially of Horace's and Catullus' Muses, are too numerous to be coincidental. Surely they indicate imitation. And if Catullus' poems to a certain extent served as model for Horace's, there is a further inevitable inference: Horace's text of Catullus 1.9 must have read *patrona virgo*, or something very much like it.

R.DEVELIN(Tasmania): *Two notes concerning Ath. Pol. (1 and 22.8)*

LCM 9.5 (May 1984), 76

1. The bones of the Alcmaeonids.

As we pick up *Ath. Pol.* 1, we read that the result of the trial of the accused was that the ones who had been responsible for the action taken against the Kylonians were cast out from their tombs, and their *genos* underwent perpetual exile. Plutarch, *Solon* 12.3, adds only that the corpses were cast beyond the borders. Is there a conflict between this version and Thucydides, 1.126.12? Thucydides wrote: ἤλασαν μὲν οὖν καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς ἐναγεῖς τούτους, ἤλασε δὲ καὶ Κλεομένης ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος ὕστερον μετὰ Ἀθηναίων στασιαζόντων, τοὺς τε ζῶντας ἐλαύνοντες καὶ τῶν τεθνεώτων τὰ ὅσα ἀνελόντες ἐξέβαλον· κατῆλθον μὲντοι ὕστερον Gomme, ad loc., took Thucydides to imply that only in 508 were the bones cast out, and thought it 'possible' [his italics] that Aristotle too said this'. I do not see that possibility. Professor Rhodes, in his commentary on *Ath. Pol.*, says (p.80) that the bones were removed, in Thucydides' account, 'apparently on the second occasion', but then (p.82) that 'Thucydides' text need not mean that the bones of the dead Alcmaeonids were removed on the second occasion but not on the first'. In fact, after mentioning the Athenians and Kleomenes, Thucydides proceeds with plural participles and a plural verb. So, assuming he has not made a plural subject out of Kleomenes and his Athenian cronies, he has either gone back to the first subject, the Athenians, treating Kleomenes' actions as a parenthesis, or has combined the two subjects, indicating that on both occasions the living were driven out and the bones removed. I favour the latter, as Kleomenes' behaviour ought to have been consistent with the original sentence, but either interpretation will remove any vestige of conflict between our sources, which is the aim of this note. We may even believe, if we wish, that the tyrants behaved similarly (Isokrates 16.26).

2. The geographical limits of ostracism.

At *Ath. Pol.* 22.8, after the return of the ostracized (in 481/0), we are told that for the future they established that those who were ostracized should dwell within Geraistos and Skyllaion or lose their citizen rights once and for all. Philochoros (*FGH* 328 F 30) later recorded in his account of ostracism that anyone ostracized should not come within Geraistos, the promontory of Euboea. These two are undoubtedly in conflict. Philochoros' expression μὴ ἐπιβαίνοντα ἐπὶ τὸς ... guarantees his meaning, while in context Aristotle could hardly have said anything else, other than that, in effect, the ostracized should keep away from the islands and areas towards the Persian sphere of influence. Rather than follow Professor Rhodes (p.282) in supposing that Philochoros actually said the same as *Ath. Pol.* and was misrepresented by the lexicographers, we should add this to other probable errors in Philochoros' account of ostracism (a majority of 6000 or more to effect an ostracism; the ten-year period later became five). Indeed, he mentions only Geraistos, with no indication that the geographical limitations were a later addition, and may merely have concluded that the Athenians must have made the ostracized depart a sufficient distance from Attika.

What do the limits represent? We may leave aside Kenyon's opinion that they were the eastern and western limits within which the ostracized had to live. The word ἐντὸς of course means 'this side of', from the Athenian point of view. A line drawn between Geraistos and Skyllaion passes through the southern tip of Attika, and it was intended that the ostracized should reside in Greece more or less to the north-west of that line, but not in Attika. It is consistent with this to find Themistokles in Argos and other areas of the Peloponnese (Thucydides 1.135.3) and Thukydides the son of Melesias in Aigina (*vit. anon.*, *Thuc.* 7). Between these two, we are told that Kimon was in the Chersonese (Andokides 3.3.) and later we find Hyperbolos in Samos (Thucydides 8.73.3). There must be doubt concerning Kimon's place of residence, but if the line between Skyllaion and Geraistos is extended, the Chersonese could be said to be 'within' it. Of course, even in the 450s the regulation need not be insisted upon, as the reasoning behind its institution was becoming redundant, the Chersonese was not exactly on the Persian doorstep, and Kimon was not likely to treat with the enemy. As for Hyperbolos, he may have chosen to forsake his rights as an Athenian, or perhaps no-one cared any more about the rule; but they were troublesome times, and Hyperbolos could, despite his reputation, have been trying to aid the Athenian cause in Samos.

The father of Miltiades, the oikist of the Chersonesos and alleged descendant of Philaios son of Aias, was a certain Kypselos (Herodotus 6.35.1), rightly identified by D.W.Bradeen, *Hesperia* 32(1963), 193, as the archon for the year 597/6. Hippokleides Teisandrou, also a Philaid, was related to the Kypselidai of Korinth (Herodotus 6.128.2). There is a further link between the Athenian family and that of the Korinthian tyrants. The mother of Philaios was Lysidike, daughter of the Lapith Koronos (K.Fiehn, *RE* 19.2[1938], 2122) and hence of the same stock from which the Kypselidai themselves claimed descent (Herodotus 5.92b1). The conclusion that the Athenian Kypselos was the son of a daughter of his Korinthian namesake has found general acceptance (see J.K.Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families*, Oxford 1971, 295). Teisandros is best fitted into the stemma as the archon's brother (Davies, loc.cit.). From the date of Kypselos' archonship and from the career of Hippokleides, suitor of Agariste in 575 or 571 and archon in 566/5, the supposed marriage can be placed in the 630s.

Marriage contracts with influential families in other states were a common feature of archaic tyrannies. Indeed, as a means of securing support abroad they formed an integral part of a tyrant's foreign policy. We might consider what particular circumstances prompted Kypselos to forge such ties with the Philaidai.

The Korinthian was not the only tyrant during this period to gain an Athenian son-in-law. Theagenes of Megara married his daughter to Kylon (Thucydides 1.126.3), the Olympic victor in the diaulos of 640 (Eusebius (Armenian version) 92 Karst). When Kylon tried to establish his own tyranny in Athens, Theagenes lent him the assistance of Megarian troops (Thucydides 1.126.4). M.Lang, *CP* 62(1967), 244, was sceptical about Kylon's links with Megara, but we know of other instances of one tyrant helping another to power, e.g. the establishment of the tyranny of Lygdamis of Naxos by Peisistratos (Herodotus 1.64.2). We are faced then with a second question - why did Theagenes value the support of Kylon, and what precisely had he to gain by backing the ill-fated coup?

The two questions, of Kypselos' relations with the Philaidai and of Theagenes with Kylon, are, one suspects, not unconnected. Can we identify a common issue at stake?

R.P.Legon, *Megara. The Political History of a Greek City-State to 336 B.C.*, Cornell UP 1981, 101, has recently revived the idea that behind Theagenes' support of Kylon's attempt lay the desire to see established in Athens a government which would acquiesce in Megarian control of Salamis. Plutarch, *Solon* 12.5, believed that prior to the coup the island was in Athenian hands, but it is more likely that Megara was the first to take over the former pirate stronghold, perhaps under Theagenes himself. Fragments 1-3 (West) of the Solonian poems bear witness to Athens' ambitions in this direction in the early 6th century. It is possible, however, that even as early as the 630s she had resented Megara's occupation of the island, and attempted to oust the settlers by force. In forming an alliance with Kylon, in Thucydides' words εὐγενὴς τε καὶ δυνατός (1.126.3), Theagenes will have hoped that his son-in-law would sway Athenian thinking in Megara's favour, perhaps first through persuasion, later through the use of force in the form of tyranny.

The Philaidai also had connexions with Salamis. Philaios, it was claimed, together with his brother Eurysakes, had once lived on Salamis and had handed over the island to Athens when they themselves moved to Attika (Plutarch, *Solon* 10.3). According to Athenian sources, Solon had cited the story before a panel of Spartan arbitrators to justify Athens' own claims (Plutarch, *ibid.*). That arbitration is better dated to the end of the 6th century rather than its beginning (see L.Piccirilli, *Gli arbitrati interstatali greci* I, 1973, 52-53), but the claim about Philaios' Salaminian origin may well be of greater antiquity. It should date from a time when Athens was insisting upon her own rights over Salamis, and when the Philaidai themselves enjoyed a particular prominence. Both conditions seem to be fulfilled in the 630s. Furthermore the myth places the family at the forefront of the campaign to seize Salamis for Athens. Presumably Kypselos of Korinth took the same line as his Athenian kinsmen; indeed it may have been the very stance taken by the Philaidai on this issue which persuaded him to enter into the marriage alliance in the first place.

To summarize my argument: in the 630s Kylon and the Philaidai took opposing positions over the question of Salamis, their views corresponding with those of the tyrants to whom they were related. Kylon and Theagenes advocated Megarian possession of the island, the Philaidai and Kypselos challenged that claim and demanded Salamis for Athens.

One final point, concerning relations between Theagenes and Kypselos. Direct evidence is lacking, but A.Andrewes, *The Greek Tyrants*, 1956, 49, suggested that the neighbouring regimes coexisted on a basis of friendship. Perhaps that view now requires revision.

78 Review: CHRISTOPHER GILL (The University College of Wales, Aberystwyth)

W.B. Stanford, *Greek Tragedy and the Emotions. An introductory study*.
Henley-on-Thames, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983. Pp.vii + 192. Cloth, £11.95.
ISBN 0 7100 9554 6

W.B. Stanford is, as is well-known, a Greek scholar of distinction. However, this is, by any standards, a rather odd little book. There is an initial problem in forming a clear idea of the book's subject. Stanford presents himself as trying to answer the question 'How did the [Greek] tragedians make their audiences cry?' (p.1). More broadly, he poses the questions, what sort of emotions did the Greek tragedians try to arouse in their audience, and what means did they use to arouse these. But it is not clear that consideration of these questions constitutes a determinate subject. For one thing, it is not self-evident that one can separate neatly emotional reactions to tragedies from other kinds of reactions (such as moral, sensuous and intellectual reactions) in the way Stanford attempts to do. And, even if this were possible, it is not self-evident that one can isolate specific types of dramatic feature as being productive of emotions. On the face of it, what makes one cry, or feel deeply moved, is the tragic performance as a whole, and the successful combination of all the elements that contribute to the composition, preparation and performance of the play. Stanford himself eventually concedes this point in part ('There is no "pure reason" in tragedy ... There is no pure emotion in tragedy either ...' p.164). But he does not explore the damaging implications of this concession for his project. And prior to making this observation, he has examined the various components of Greek tragedy ('the aural element', 'the visual element', 'vocabulary and stylistic figures', 'subject-matter, imagery, irony and structure') in an attempt to isolate the distinctively emotive qualities of each component.

The basic peculiarity in Stanford's project is partly disguised by a sustained ambivalence about whether his subject is emotions or 'emotionalism' (by which he seems to mean 'the production of intense emotions'). It is perhaps more plausible to claim that certain features (or certain types of feature) in Greek tragedy are designed to produce intense emotions in the audience. And much of the detailed discussion of the book is concerned with features that may be ascribed to this type, such as passionate cries or interjections, descriptions of violence, grotesque or revolting verbal images, especially sexual ones. However, features of this type raise a further issue which is largely unexamined in this book. Whether these features contribute to a tragic effect, as distinct from a purely horrific one, depends not only on the nature of the features themselves but also on the overall dramatic context. To repeat this point, it is unclear that one can correlate 'tragic emotions' with localized components of the plays. Stanford's discussion of these features is problematic in another respect also. It is often unclear whether the emotions with which Stanford is concerned are those of the audience, those which the actors portray, or those which are discussed or described by actors or chorus. Of course, these different emotions are mutually related, but they are not identical (as Stanford himself notes, pp.46-48), and the relationships between them are often quite complicated. Stanford's discussion seems to slide from one type of emotion to the other without clear demarcation. For instance, he concludes his survey of the 'tragic' emotions in the *Agamemnon* with the following 'statistics' (p. 160):

References to grief in general are by far the most frequent (about twenty-seven). Joy comes next with about twelve. Then come anger (nine), *philia* (eight), pity (seven), and *erōs* (six). Fear and hate have five appearances each, and next to them are anxiety, *stúgos*, *philanthrōpía*, *éklēxis* (three each), *póthos*, *nēmesis*, *aidōs*, *tarachē* and an unspecified passion (two each).

It is far from clear, here or in the preceding discussion, whether these 'statistics' refer to the use of particular Greek terms in the play, or to emotions which Stanford sees as being described, represented, or stimulated in the audience by particular passages. This is an ambivalence which tends to undermine the usefulness of Stanford's discussion of the *Agamemnon* and of other samples of Greek tragedy.

There is a further ambivalence in the book, and this concerns the author's attitude to his subject. The book's subtitle is 'An introductory study'; and Stanford explains that he means by this that he is attempting to make a provisional study of a large and complex subject (p.2). This suggests that the project is heuristic and exploratory. Correspondingly, Stanford examines evidence which might

help us to understand the Greek view of emotions, and of the means (especially verbal) by which emotions can be produced in an audience, evidence drawn especially from the rhetorical treatises of Aristotle and his successors. It is useful to have this evidence assembled. Indeed, I think the critical categories of the rhetorical treatises, and particularly their distinction between *ethos* and *pathos* (or the 'ethical' and 'emotional' styles), are potentially illuminating, certainly for Hellenistic and Roman literature, and conceivably too for Greek tragedy. In these treatises, in fact, Stanford might find some justification for his project of treating emotions, and the production of emotions, in Greek tragedy as a separate subject. But I think one needs to make a rather careful study of ancient categories, in an attempt to reconstruct their critical framework, before applying these categories to ancient literature. Stanford, however, makes no real attempt to follow this procedure. He has barely started to discuss Aristotle's catalogue of emotions in Book Two of the *Rhetoric*, before he begins to apply Aristotle's terms to Greek tragedy (pp.23ff.). And in his application of these terms, he brings to bear critical judgements and a critical sensibility that go well beyond anything he claims to find in Aristotle or in other ancient sources. Both here and elsewhere in the book, one has the feeling that Stanford believes that he already knows what is emotionally powerful in Greek tragedy, and that he is writing to tell us this.

Now, if that is what Stanford really thinks, and what he wants to do in this book, that is fair enough. After a life-time's study of Greek literature, and other literatures, Stanford no doubt does have a clear sense of what he finds 'emotional' in Greek tragedy; and, given his enviable sensitivity to the colour and power of the Greek language, his feelings on the matter have some weight. Taken as a mosaic of intuitive responses to striking passages in Greek tragedy, presented in a clear, lively manner, this book has genuine value. Classical Studies students might find the book particularly helpful (all quotations are translated). Despite Dover's call for scholars of Greek to communicate to 'the general reader' the aesthetic appeal (and interpretative importance) of Greek style (*Proceedings of the Classical Association* 73[1976], 9-19), recent critical studies of Greek tragedy designed for a general audience have not concentrated on this aspect of the plays. As 'an introductory study', in this sense, this book is worth recommending. But for students and scholars who are interested in exploring in any depth the origins of the emotional power of Greek tragedy in general, or of particular Greek tragedies (such as the *Agamemnon*), I think this book will prove unsatisfactory and superficial.

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STEPHEN HINDS(Girton College, Cambridge): cave canem *Ovid, Fasti* 4.500

LCM 9.5(May 1984), 79

quo simul ac venit, frenatos curribus angues
ingit et aequoreas sicca pererrat aquas.
effugit et Syrtes et tu, Zancleae Charybdi,
e vos, Nisei, naufraga monstra, canes.

Ovid, *Fasti* 4.497-500

Ceres' chariot ride from Sicily to Attica takes her into deeper waters than may be immediately apparent. 'There were indeed *magni poetae* who confused, or consciously contaminated, the stories of the two Scyllas [viz. the sea-monster and the daughter of Nisus]' - so R.O.A.M. Lyne's (Cambridge 1978) commentary on the well-known *Ciris* 54ff. discussion. 'Confused, or consciously contaminated': here at least (to leave for another day *Am.* 3.12.21.2, *Ars* 1.331-2, *Rem.* 737 and *Her.* 12.123-4) Ovid, who tends to write his own commentaries, doesn't risk being denied the benefit of the doubt. His *Nisei* ... *canes* are a hazard to conventional marine traffic; but they are *naufraga monstra* in another sense too. The poet's progress in the task of writing the *Fasti* is repeatedly described, by a programmatic image common in Ovid and in ancient literature in general (see E.J. Kenney in *Ovidiana* ed. Herescu, Paris 1958, 205-6), in terms of the progress of a ship over the sea: *Fast.* 1.3-4 *excipe ... | hoc opus et timidae derige navis iter*; also 1.466, 2.3 & 863-4, 3.790, and, in the present book, 4.18 & 729-30. This is the ship which is truly in danger of being sunk by the *Nisei* ... *canes*. After such a mythological howler, the envious may ask, how can a *doctus poeta* go on? But of course the *Fasti* do continue: the poetic shipwreck is a sham, with the mistake literally including in the words *naufraga monstra* an acknowledgement of its own self-consciousness. Moreover, it is arguable that a pun in the previous couplet has already given the game away. *aequoreas sicca pererrat aquas*: Ceres wanders a great deal in the course of this narrative (cf. *Fasti* 4.465, 568, 573, 575, 589); but her passage through these particular waters involves, as is about to emerge, more than one kind of *error*.

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VIVIEN ELLIS(Newcastle upon Tyne): *Why cheese?* (Tibullus 2.5.33-38)

LCM 9.5(May 1984), 80

at qua Velabri regio patet, vix solebat
 exiguis pulsa per vada linter aqua.
 illa saepe gregis diti placitura magistro 35
 ad iuvenem festa est vecta puella die,
 cum qua fecundi redierant munera ruris,
 caseus et niveae candidus agnus ovis. Tibullus 2.5.33-38

'When Propertius later mentioned the Velabrum, a marshy region of Rome which by the Augustan age had been drained, he wrote

qua Velabra suo stagnabant flumine quoque
 nauta per urbanus velificabat aquas (4.9.5f.)

In this way he implied that the name Velabrum derived from *velum* (sail). He may also have been hinting at an etymology from the Greek (F)έλος (marsh) by the allusive use of *stagnabant*⁹⁸. Tibullus on the other hand prefers the Varronian etymology: *velabrum* a *vehendo* (De Lingua Latina 5.44). He makes this clear in three ways: by the use of *vecta* in line 36; by specifically making the point that boats were rowed (*pulsa ... aqua* 34) and not sailed through the Velabrum; and finally by specifying that the boats were small (*exiguus ... linter* 34) which implies that they were too small to need or be able to carry sails. In this way Tibullus learnedly denies the 'sail' etymology adopted later by Propertius, and affirms *vehor* as the source of *Velabrum*. The difference between Propertius' bold and open approach to this problem and Tibullus' allusive subtlety is instructive.

98. On such Greek-Latin derivations involving the digamma cf. Dion.Hal.Ant.Rom.1.20.1.20.2f. (esp. on *Velia*).'

F.Cairns, *Tibullus: A Hellenistic Poet at Rome*, Cambridge University Press 1979, 81

We may support Cairns' suggestion that *Velabra ... stagnabant* (Propertius 4.9.5) is hinting at an etymology from (F)έλος by recalling that Virgil had already made a similar suggestion at *Aeneid* 3.698 *praepinguis solum stagnantis Helori*. But the difference between Propertius and Tibullus is more complex than it seems. It is not the whole story to say that Tibullus prefers the Varronian etymology *Velabrum* a *vehendo*, since Propertius himself also puts forward that same etymology, as K.F.Smith points out on 4.2.7 *remorum auditos per vada pulsa sonos*. So Tibullus is arguing for the Varronian a *vehendo* by using *vecta*, *pulsa ... aqua*, and *linter*; Propertius argues for (F)έλος by *stagnabant*, for *vela* by *velificabat*, and for *veh* by *remorum ... sonos*. It is not easy to see how Propertius is more bold than Tibullus, or Tibullus more allusively subtle than Propertius.

In this chapter Cairns is demonstrating the Hellenistic learning of Tibullus, and indicates two other aspects of it which come together also in Virgil *Aeneid* 8 and Propertius 4.1, namely aetiology and the imaginative reconstruction of primitive life. These aspects apply more closely to Tibullus 2.5.33-38 than Cairns shows. Firstly, we may ask what exactly is the young woman doing in 35-38? She is rowing out of the city *ad iuvenem*; she is *placitura magistro gregis*; then she is returning home with a cheese and a lamb. Here the love-making is a canonical accompaniment of birthdays, as Cairns argues, but it is also an instance of the conferment of sexual pleasure by the woman in primitive society in exchange for rural gifts. We are not far from the primitive world of Lucretius 5.962-5:

et Venus in silvis iungebat corpora amantum:
 concilial at enim vel mutua quancumque Cupido
 vel violenta viri vis atque impensa libido
 vel pretium, glandes atque arbuta vel pira lecta.

Secondly, why a lamb and why a cheese? In contemporary Rome the Velabrum was the centre of the food shops as in Plautus, *Circulio* 483-4:

in Velabro vel pistorem vel lanium vel haruspicem
 vel qui psi vortant vel qui aliis ubi vorsentur praebeant.

Cf. Horace, *Satire* 2.3.229, where *prostabant omnia quae ad victus rationem et delicias pertinebant* (Comm.Cru.). The *lanius* would be offering lamb for sale. Here too was the place to buy cheeses, as in Martial 11.52.9-10

altera non derunt tenui versata favilla
 et Velabrensi massa coacta foco,

and 13.32

non quemcumque locum nec fumum caseus omnem,
 sed Velabrenum qui bibit, ille sapit.

Tibullus here, like Virgil in the walk of Evander and Aeneas, is setting his reconstruction of primitive life against the present realities of the capital city. He is suggesting an origin for the cheese shops and butchers' shops in the Velabrum, thereby adding aetiology to the etymology.

Nor are the etymological possibilities of the Velabrum exhausted by Tibullus and Propertius; Ovid thinks of another, *Velabrum* a *non velato*, at *Fasti* 6.505-512:

qua Velabra solent in Circum ducere pompas ... 505
 hic quoque lucus erat iunctis et arundine densus, 511
 et pede velato non adeunda palus.